The Azerbaijan State News Agency (AZERTAC) made an interview with Dr. Mehmet Fatih Oztarsu, Deputy Director of the Seoul Institute of Global Affairs (SIGA).
– The 2025 became a turning point in the normalization of relations between Baku and Yerevan, including the signing of a joint declaration in Washington. How does Türkiye assess Armenia’s readiness to sign the final peace treaty in 2026?
– From the Turkish perspective, 2025 marked a qualitative turning point in negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, particularly with the Washington Joint Declarations. Ankara assesses Yerevan’s readiness to finalize a peace treaty in 2026 not as a question of intent alone, but as a test of credibility, consistency and implementation at the current stage.
Ankara recognizes that the current Armenian leadership under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has shown a noticeably higher level of political willingness than previous administrations to pursue normalization and a comprehensive peace settlement. Even today, Robert Kocharian and Serzh Sargsyan demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the ongoing peace talks. The willingness of the Pashinyan government, expressed through public statements, diplomatic engagement, and the acceptance of a mutually agreed draft text, is significant, especially considering Armenia’s domestic political constraints.
At the same time, Ankara closely aligns its assessment with Azerbaijan’s core expectations, which remain central to the sustainability of any agreement. From this viewpoint, Baku’s priorities are clear: the unequivocal recognition of sovereignty and territorial integrity, the absence of any residual or constitutional ambiguity regarding territorial claims, and the firm commitment that no third-party military presence will be institutionalized along the border. These are not symbolic demands; they are seen as the backbone of a durable peace. Especially, this is the core approach for confidence-building among the parties.
An interesting and often overlooked dimension is that, unlike earlier phases of the conflict, the current process is increasingly shaped by legal and institutional benchmarks rather than battlefield dynamics. In Ankara’s reading, this creates both an opportunity and a responsibility for the Pashinyan government: political readiness must be translated into structural and legal alignment with the principles already accepted at the negotiating table.
In short, the Turkish side believes that Armenia’s willingness under the current government is real and politically meaningful. Whether this willingness matures into a finalized peace treaty in 2026, however, will ultimately depend on Yerevan’s ability to meet Azerbaijan’s expectations in a clear, verifiable and irreversible manner. If that convergence is achieved, Ankara views the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement not only as possible, but also as a historic step toward long-term stability and regional integration in the South Caucasus. Naturally, the upcoming elections in Armenia will play an important role because some political groups are harshly rejecting the ongoing peace rhetoric of the Pashinyan government. The formation of an anti-peace government is one of the biggest concerns in this regard.
– Currently, the TRIPP project is actively considered as part of the Zangezur corridor. How crucial is this route for Türkiye in terms of unification of the Turkic world and strengthening of the Middle Corridor?
– The TRIPP initiative and the discussions surrounding the Zangezur Corridor should be understood as part of a much broader connectivity ecosystem in which Türkiye has already been playing a growing bridge role. Long before TRIPP entered the agenda, projects such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC) and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline (BTE) demonstrated how strategic infrastructure could reshape regional geopolitics by anchoring cooperation in shared economic interests.
From Ankara’s perspective, TRIPP would significantly amplify this existing role. It would not only strengthen the country’s direct land connectivity with Azerbaijan and Central Asia, but also generate new layers of cooperation across energy, logistics, trade and industrial supply chains. In that sense, the project is not about a single corridor; it is about multiplying interaction points between regions that have long remained disconnected due to unresolved political conflicts.
Importantly, the benefits of this route extend well beyond the regional countries. A fully functional Zangezur-Middle Corridor axis would enhance access to European markets, deepen linkages with the Middle East, and even create indirect gains for South Asia by improving east-west and north-south connectivity. For decades, regional cooperation in the South Caucasus was largely sidelined by security concerns and frozen disputes. What we are witnessing now is a gradual shift toward a new agenda where connectivity and economic interdependence are moving to the center of regional politics.
The Turkish side has been consistent on this point from the very beginning. Ankara has repeatedly underlined its readiness to support this vision through both railway and highway connections, and to integrate the project into its existing transport and logistics infrastructure. This is not a rhetorical commitment; it reflects the country’s long-term strategy of positioning itself as a reliable connector across continents.
In short, TRIPP has the potential to consolidate Türkiye’s bridge role that began with BTC and BTE, while opening the door to a new era of regional cooperation. If managed inclusively and pragmatically, it could transform a geography once defined by division into one defined by opportunity for the regional countries and for a much wider network stretching from Europe to Asia.
– Azerbaijan, successfully balancing between major world powers, maintains its agenda. What, in your opinion, is the secret behind the Azerbaijani diplomacy enabling the country to be a reliable partner for both West and East?
– Azerbaijan’s diplomatic success did not emerge overnight; it is the product of a long-term strategic vision that dates back to the balance policy articulated by Heydar Aliyev. From the very beginning, this approach was built on the idea that Azerbaijan should act as a constructive regional actor, engage all major powers on an equal footing, and avoid being locked into exclusive or restrictive alignments.
According to his vision, Azerbaijan’s strength lies not only in benefiting from global opportunities, but also in offering opportunities to others. This philosophy shaped a foreign policy that is outward-looking rather than defensive: one that seeks engagement over isolation, dialogue over polarization, and cooperation over dependency. In practice, this meant maintaining open channels with both Western and Eastern actors while preserving full control over sovereign decision-making.
Geography and material capacity have played a decisive role in making this balance policy viable. Situated at the crossroads of Europe and Asia and endowed with significant energy and transit potential, Azerbaijan transformed its geostrategic location and material resources into diplomatic leverage. Balance, therefore, was not a rhetorical choice but a structurally grounded strategy, one that aligned perfectly with the country’s objective conditions.
Over time, this approach has delivered tangible results. Azerbaijan achieved several significant outcomes: first, it avoided regional isolation; second, it enhanced its visibility and relevance on the global stage; third, it strengthened its economy and defense capabilities; and fourth, it established itself as a key facilitator of peace diplomacy in a historically fragmented region. Equally important, Baku has used its diplomatic space to amplify the voices of communities and actors that often struggle to be heard in international forums, reinforcing its image as a responsible and inclusive actor.
Taken together, these elements explain why Azerbaijan today exhibits many of the core attributes of an emerging middle power: strategic autonomy, functional diplomacy, material capability, agenda-setting capacity, and a willingness to contribute to regional and global public goods. Rather than pursuing balance as an end in itself, Azerbaijan treats it as a dynamic tool for sustaining sovereignty, relevance, and influence.
In this sense, Azerbaijan’s ongoing diplomatic effort is not merely about managing its role in the region where great power competition is going on but also about consolidating a middle power role based on stability, connectivity, and constructive engagement. This is a trajectory the country continues to pursue with notable consistency and confidence.
It is also important to underline that the opposite scenario was entirely possible. Azerbaijan could have chosen a very different path like remaining an energy-rich but politically isolated country, inward-looking, risk-averse, and largely irrelevant to regional and global dynamics. Many resource-rich states fall into this pattern, where energy wealth substitutes for diplomacy rather than empowering it. Azerbaijan deliberately avoided this trajectory. Instead of allowing its resources to lock it into isolation, it used them as instruments of engagement, connectivity, and influence. This strategic choice transformed energy from a passive asset into an active diplomatic tool, elevating Azerbaijan’s relevance in both its immediate neighborhood and the wider international system. Taken together, these are precisely the factors that position Azerbaijan on a clear trajectory toward middle power status.