For years, Europe’s energy security debate focused on Russia’s ability to weaponise supply, pricing, and dependence. This debate is still valid, yet the war in Ukraine has added another dimension: energy is no longer only a source of leverage used by suppliers, but also became a battlefield in itself.
On the fourth of July 2026, Ukrainian forces struck oil and port infrastructure near Saint Petersburg, providing a clear illustration of this. Euronews reported that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Ukrainian forces hit “port oil infrastructure” that generates revenue for Russia’s war, while AP described the attack as part of Ukraine’s “long-range sanctions.” The Guardian also reported that Ukrainian drones hit the St Petersburg oil terminal and nearby port infrastructure, including Vysotsk port in the Leningrad region, which handles commodities such as oil and LNG.
This incident should not be read only as another update. It illustrates a wider transformation in the meaning of energy security. The question is no longer only as in who controls energy flows, or which country depends on which supplier. It is also whether the physical systems that produce, refine, store, transport and finance energy can survive disruption.
Developments since that attack have reinforced the point. Further strikes have hit major refineries and energy facilities deeper inside Russia, while the resulting disruption has contributed to fuel shortages, export restrictions, and downward revisions to Russian oil-production forecasts.
From Weaponised Energy to Vulnerable Energy
Russia’s energy power has long rested on more than natural resources. It depends on export infrastructure, refineries, ports, pipelines, storage facilities, insurance channels, shipping routes, and domestic fuel logistics. These systems connect energy production to state revenue, military supply, and political stability. When they are attacked, the target is not only a single facility, but the wider chain that turns oil and gas into usable power, revenue, and strategic influence.
This is the deeper sense of Ukraine’s long-range campaign. Russia previously used energy dependence as a source of pressure against Europe and Ukraine. Now Ukraine is trying to expose the vulnerability of the infrastructure behind that power. Recent strikes on refineries in Krasnodar and Yaroslavl show that Kyiv is not only targeting symbolic assets, but also the facilities that sustain Russia’s fuel supply and export capacity. The Slavyansk refinery in Krasnodar, for example, has been reported to have a capacity of around 100,000 barrels per day and to supply fuel for both domestic use and export.
This does not mean Russia’s energy system is collapsing. Russia remains a major oil producer and exporter, and the state still has tools to manage shortages, redirect supply, regulate prices or use reserves. But the attacks reveal something important, which is energy leverage can also become energy vulnerability. The same infrastructure that gives a state economic and strategic power can become a pressure point when it is exposed to long-range attack.
A Pattern, Not an Isolated Strike
The strongest argument here is not built on one strike near Saint Petersburg. It is built on the wider pattern. Ukrainian attacks have repeatedly targeted refineries, oil terminals, depots and pipeline-related infrastructure, while Russia continues to target Ukrainian energy assets. The war has made energy infrastructure a recurring object of military pressure from both sides.
The campaign has continued to expand in both range and effect. A Ukrainian strike on the Omsk refinery which is Russia’s largest, demonstrated that facilities far beyond the immediate border region are now exposed. Subsequent disruption pushed Russia toward fuel-export restrictions and increased reliance on imports and reserves to stabilise domestic supply.
The effects inside Russia are now visible enough to require state-level management. The pressure has reached the domestic fuel market, where independent filling stations have reportedly sold fuel above 100 roubles per litre for the first time, with some stations reaching 120–140 roubles. Wholesale markets have also come under strain: sales volumes of AI-92 gasoline and diesel on the St Petersburg International Mercantile Exchange were reported to be less than half their June 2025 levels, while AI-95 volumes were down by about a third. In some wholesale markets, delivery delays of one to two months had become normal.
Other indicators point in the same direction. In Sevastopol, gasoline prices reportedly rose by 30% in one week, while some regions experiencing shortages saw prices far above the national average. The Moscow refinery, the largest fuel supplier to the Moscow region, has also reportedly faced a prolonged shutdown after drone attacks caused extensive damage. These examples do not prove systemic collapse, but they show how attacks on refining and distribution can create pressure through shortages, price stress, delays, repair costs, and public frustration.
These details matter because they move the analysis beyond general language about “critical infrastructure.” They show the specific channels through which infrastructure attacks create pressure. They create domestic shortages, price stress, distribution delays, refinery downtime, transport disruption and political discomfort. Energy infrastructure is therefore not only an economic asset. In wartime, it becomes part of state capacity.
Energy Security Is Becoming Infrastructure Security
The broader policy lesson is that energy security can no longer be minimised to only supply diversification. Diversification remains essential, especially for Europe after the shock of dependence on Russian gas. But diversification answers only one question, where does this energy come from? But it does not fully answer whether the systems that move, store, refine, distribute, and control energy are resilient enough to withstand attack.
This is where Ukraine’s experience has wider relevance. The International Energy Agency’s report on energy system resilience presents Ukraine’s experience as a source of lessons for dealing with high-impact disruptions, including cyberattacks, physical attacks on infrastructure, extreme weather, and unexpected infrastructure failures. The report’s core lesson is not limited to wartime Ukraine, but the modern energy systems need the capacity to withstand, adapt to, and rapidly recover from shocks.
For the rest of Europe, this is not a distant issue. NATO states that energy security is a vital element of resilience and links it to cyber and hybrid threats affecting both land and offshore infrastructure. The European Union has also moved in this direction through the Critical Entities Resilience Directive, which aims to strengthen the resilience of critical entities across sectors including energy, transport, digital infrastructure, public administration, space, and food.
The point is not that Europe should treat every energy asset as a military target. The point is that energy systems now sit at the intersection of war, markets, technology and infrastructure. Refineries, ports, storage sites, electricity grids, pipelines, undersea cables and digital control systems are increasingly part of the same security framework. A country may diversify its suppliers and still remain vulnerable if key nodes are easy to disrupt or slow to repair.
Policy Implications for Europe
The first implication is that European energy policy needs a clearer map of vulnerability. Governments often measure energy security through import shares, prices, storage levels, and supplier diversification. These indicators remain useful, but they should be matched with a more practical mapping of critical nodes: refineries, terminals, pipeline junctions, LNG facilities, power substations, storage sites, digital control systems, and cross-border interconnectors
Secondly is the need for redundancy. Resilience is not only about preventing attacks. It is also about limiting the damage when disruption happens. That means spare capacity, alternative routes, cyber-secure control systems, emergency coordination between public and private operators, and faster restoration plans.
The third implication is that energy security must be treated as a cross-sector issue. The Russian fuel crisis shows how disruption in refining and distribution can affect transport, prices, agriculture and public confidence. In Europe, a similar logic applies. Energy infrastructure is connected to ports, digital networks, financial systems, military mobility and food supply. Protecting it cannot be left only to energy ministries or market regulators.
Europe should therefore avoid a false feeling of security after reducing dependence on Russian gas. Although the shift is necessary, but the next steps are generally more challenging. They are more about building energy systems that can absorb shocks, adapt under pressure, and recover quickly when critical nodes are damaged.