What Is Different This Time?
In his August Liberation Day address, President Lee Jae-myung announced three blueprints for peaceful coexistence between South and North Korea. The first is “inclusive peaceful coexistence,” rooted in mutual respect. The second is “stable peaceful coexistence,” aimed at preventing military clashes. The third is “responsible peaceful coexistence,” intended to contribute to global peace. On this basis, the government seeks to normalize inter-Korean relations and ease military tensions. It also aims to replace the armistice system with a peace regime, while seeking to halt North Korea’s nuclear buildup and advance toward denuclearization.
Yet I would ask the government to consider two further questions. First, how does this blueprint differ from earlier policies? Second, how exactly will it be implemented?
In fact, the blueprint’s goals are quite familiar to us. Article 1 of the 1991 Inter-Korean Basic Agreement affirmed mutual recognition and respect for each other’s systems. Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy also stressed respect for each other’s systems and inter-Korean exchanges. In 2017, Moon Jae-in’s Berlin Initiative rejected unification through absorption. The 2018 Panmunjom Declaration went beyond easing military tensions and envisioned an end-of-war declaration. It also called for three-party talks involving both Koreas and the United States, or four-party talks including China. Today’s three blueprints overlap substantially with goals pursued by previous governments for decades.
Policy continuity is not itself a problem. No government can easily abandon peaceful coexistence. It is a principle that should survive changes in administration. With inter-Korean relations severed, reaffirming that principle still matters. Nor should uncertainty about Pyongyang’s response close the door to dialogue. The blueprints reaffirm South Korea’s enduring commitment to peace on the peninsula.
The more difficult question is whether the government has learned enough from earlier attempts to pursue the same goals under different circumstances. Previous administrations did not fail simply because their commitment to peace was insufficient. They encountered disagreements over security, verification, sanctions, and the terms of cooperation. Any new initiative must take these difficulties seriously rather than assume that a renewed declaration of intent will produce a different response.
But unchanged goals do not require unchanged methods. We should instead recognize how sharply the peninsula’s political environment has changed. The goal of peaceful coexistence remains, but the conditions for achieving it have grown far more complex.
A Different North Korea, a Different Region
In 2018, the two Korean leaders affirmed shared goals of peace and denuclearization at Panmunjom. Both sides then showed at least some willingness to improve relations through dialogue. Since late 2023, however, North Korea has described inter-Korean relations as those between “two hostile states.” This marked a fundamental departure from its previous approach to unification. Pyongyang now treats Seoul as a separate hostile state. Past agreements failed to institutionalize peace even when both sides had agreed on common goals. Today, even that foundation has weakened. Yet a similar vision of coexistence has returned.
The international environment has also changed. North Korea continues to advance its nuclear and missile capabilities. This reinforces Pyongyang’s claim that its nuclear status is irreversible. Military cooperation with Russia, strengthened amid the war in Ukraine, has broadened North Korea’s strategic options. Ties with Russia may offer benefits Pyongyang once sought through better relations with Seoul or Washington. North Korea once considered dialogue with Seoul as a way to ease its international isolation. Today, it has less reason to prioritize improving those ties. US-China strategic rivalry and Russia’s increasingly assertive foreign policy further complicate efforts to resolve tensions on the peninsula.
This presents a problem that earlier engagement policies did not face in quite the same form. South Korea must now consider how to pursue coexistence when North Korea no longer recognizes reconciliation or eventual unification as shared political objectives. Dialogue may still be possible, but the reasons for entering negotiations have changed. Seoul cannot assume that Pyongyang will respond to proposals for cooperation in the same way it did during previous periods of engagement.
Still, these changes do not mean peaceful engagement is no longer possible. A military clash in East Asia would inflict immense damage across several countries. The peninsula’s future is also tied to strategic competition among neighboring powers. That makes crisis management and diplomatic channels even more crucial. Short-term gains in relations with Pyongyang can matter. But preventing needless clashes and building long-term trust may matter more. Peaceful coexistence is necessary for these practical reasons as well.
Renewed dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang also remains possible. The Trump administration’s interest in renewed talks could create an opening. But renewed US-North Korea dialogue and improved inter-Korean relations are separate matters. Pyongyang may bypass Seoul and negotiate directly with Washington. If so, Seoul must consider its role in building a peace regime. As regional strategic relationships change, familiar diplomatic proposals require more careful planning to produce results.
What Will Make It Work?
Many people will be more concerned with the strategy for achieving peaceful coexistence. Dialogue can endure when both sides see benefits. Yet North Korea shows little interest in improving relations with South Korea. Instead, it relies on nuclear weapons and regional partnerships to secure its regime. Why, then, would South Korea’s peace proposals alter Pyongyang’s strategic calculations? Does Seoul have new means to influence its choices? Without addressing these questions, emphasizing peaceful coexistence alone may not deliver the intended results.
That said, Lee’s approach is not simply a repeat of earlier policies. His government has halted loudspeaker broadcasts toward North Korea and pursued measures to ease border tensions. It has also sought institutional reforms for inter-Korean cooperation. On denuclearization, it favors a phased approach rather than demanding complete denuclearization before negotiations begin. The government has proposed halting further advances in North Korea’s nuclear capabilities as an initial step, with reductions and eventual denuclearization remaining longer-term goals. These measures could lower the risk of military conflict and prepare the ground for future talks.
Nevertheless, easing tensions and changing the other side’s behavior are different matters. South Korean restraint does not guarantee reciprocal steps from Pyongyang. A phased approach may lower the barrier to negotiations. But an initial nuclear freeze may not lead to actual reductions. Past inter-Korean agreements and US-North Korea summits did take place. Yet they failed to overcome disagreements over sanctions, distrust, and conflicting national interests. The South Korean government should critically examine these experiences. Only then can it consider new ways to address unresolved problems.
A practical strategy should therefore distinguish between what Seoul can achieve on its own and what requires cooperation from Pyongyang. South Korea can take steps to reduce the likelihood of accidental clashes, maintain diplomatic communication with relevant partners, and prepare proposals for future negotiations. But restoring inter-Korean dialogue and making progress on denuclearization require decisions by North Korea as well. Recognizing this distinction would allow the government to set more realistic priorities and assess its policies without treating every refusal from Pyongyang as a failure.
Peaceful coexistence cannot be judged solely by North Korea’s response. Inter-Korean relations do not depend on Seoul’s will alone. That is precisely why the government needs a more refined strategy. How can it give Pyongyang reasons to return to dialogue? How will it respond to stronger North Korea-Russia cooperation? If US-North Korea talks resume, what role will Seoul play? What is the plan if Pyongyang continues to refuse engagement? Peaceful coexistence is a long-term vision. It also needs achievable interim goals and clear standards for assessing progress. Simply put, the commitment to peace cannot replace the strategy to achieve it. This is the question Lee’s blueprints must answer in today’s changed circumstances.