Tensions continue to be high on the Korean Peninsula. The presence of large-scale military forces and nuclear weapons threatens regional peace and stability. In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the active involvement of North Korean troops alongside the Russian army, two hostile camps have emerged, leading the geopolitical landscape around the Korean Peninsula to shift into a confrontational structure of ‘North Korea-China-Russia’ versus ‘South Korea-US-Japan’. In these circumstances, US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un have indicated openness to resuming dialogue, while the visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Pyongyang in June 2026 is resurrecting hopes that Beijing would be a front-line mediator, raising also questions about a potential role of the European Union (EU) in advancing the Korean Peninsula peace process.
In the last years, the EU and its member states have increased their support for the US-led camp, both bilaterally and in framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Since 2022, NATO summits have emphasized the challenge coming from the Russia-China-North Korea axis and invited the leaders of South Korea and Japan on the shared understanding that what happens in East Asia can directly impact European security. Concurrently, the EU has hardened its position vis-a-vis Moscow and Pyongyang, as well as Beijing which is accused by Brussels of being the main enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Beginning in 2022 – and coinciding with the accession to power of former ROK President Yoon Suk Yeo – the EU and South Korea have bolstered their security, defense and military cooperation, with South Korea becoming a major partner supplying weapons to Europe.
The security synchronization between Europe and the Korean Peninsula
On 4 November 2024, Brussels and Seoul signed a ‘Security and Defence Partnership’ emphasizing their commitment to the development of a joint defence industry partnership, including increased cooperation on arms production between South Korean producers and European governments through direct procurement, but also licensed production and joint ventures, linking further the two opposite sides of the Eurasian landmass.
The security synchronization between the Korean Peninsula and Europe is most evident in the establishment of an annual Security and Defense Dialogue between the heads of the Korean ministries of foreign affairs and defense and their EU counterparts. Moreover, at the EU-South Korea Summit in June 2026 the two sides committed to negotiating a Security of Information Agreement, a critical step to securely exchange classified intelligence regarding troop movements and arms transfers.
Concurrently, at the EU-Japan Summit in July 2025, the two sides pledged to deepen defense cooperation, focusing on areas such as cyber, defence industry, maritime security and space, while EU-China political relations have been severely downgraded, not least due to Brussels’ repeated complaints about closer China-Russia ties. The EU has imposed sanctions on several Chinese entities providing direct or indirect support to Russia’s military industrial complex or engaging in sanctions circumvention – a dynamic that strengthens further the confrontational structure of ‘North Korea-China-Russia’ versus ‘South Korea-US-Japan’.
A return to dialogue and cooperation?
The election of Lee Jae Myung as ROK President in June 2025 and his avowed intention to strengthen cooperation with Japan and China, placing emphasis on ‘pragmatic diplomacy and ties with neighbors’, including dialogue with the DPRK and maintaining the ROK-US alliance while rejecting confrontation with China, has potential to trigger new, and more peaceful, prospects for the region, putting an end to – or at least mending – the most damaging effects of the Russia-Ukraine war on the Korean Peninsula. The return of a progressive administration in Seoul has also raised expectations that there will be a new push for linking the renewal of engagement with the North with the strengthening of the process of ROK-China-Japan trilateral cooperation which, before the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, was one of the hallmarks of EU-ROK collaboration in Northeast Asia.
The trilateral cooperation process is the only consultative mechanisms which involves the three Northeast Asian nations and that seeks to deal with the question of security on the Korean peninsula from a purely regional perspective. This dialogue forum was first proposed by Seoul in 2004, as a meeting outside the framework of the ASEAN + 3 (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus China, Japan, and South Korea) – itself a by-product of the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) – with the three major economies of Northeast Asia having a separate forum to themselves.
The US has traditionally given lukewarm support to ROK-China-Japan trilateral process, since it includes Beijing but excludes Washington. The latter continues to rely on its military alliances with Japan and South Korea, seeking to contain China’s regional ambitions. This trend has accelerated under US President Joe Biden who has reached out to allies in East Asia, as demonstrated by the US-Japan-South Korea trilateral meeting held at the margin of the NATO summit in June 2022 and the boosting of their defence cooperation occurred at Camp David in August 2023. The EU, on the other hand, has become over the years the staunchest international supporter of the process of ROK-China-Japan trilateral cooperation, both politically and financially. The EU Delegation in Seoul would regularly invite young students who participate in the Young Ambassadors Program organized by the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat to various workshops – funded by the EU – with the aim to promote mutual understanding and the sense of friendship among future leaders of South Korea, Japan, and China.
Under former ROK President Yoon Suk Yeo – and following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war which has led to the emergence of two competing camps in Northeast Asia – ROK-China-Japan trilateral cooperation at the level of government and ministries has been downgraded. Yet, the process has continued at the local level– a dynamic that has important implications for the ROK administration of Lee Jae Myung and the EU, since it could provide the foundation for Seoul and Brussels to restart collaboration on supporting regional dialogue and trust-building. For instance, at the end of June 2023, Incheon Metropolitan City Mayor Yoo Jeong-bok, proposed a trilateral conference between governors and mayors at the helm of local governments in the ROK, China, and Japan to facilitate cooperation and exchange between the three countries and help build a better future for Northeast Asia.
The Trilateral Local Government Exchange Conference has emerged as a key driver for regional cooperation. Established in 1999, the Conference is an annual gathering of local governments from the ROK, China and Japan, aimed at strengthening relationships and promoting trilateral cooperation at the municipal level. Since 2013, the Seoul-based Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat participates in the Trilateral Local Government Exchange Conference as an observer. In October 2024, after a few years of interruptions, the 25th Trilateral Local Government Exchange Conference was held in Gwangju, assembling local governments from the ROK, China and Japan.
While the EU has traditionally lent its support to the trilateral cooperation process at the state level, the new activism by local governments opens new avenues for EU-Korea cooperation. Within the EU, there is a distinctive body – the European Committee of the Regions (CoR) – which is tasked to give regions and cities a formal say in EU law making, ensuring that the position and needs of regional and local authorities are respected. The European Parliament, the Council of the EU and the European Commission consult the CoR on matters of relevance to local and regional authorities.
Less known is the fact that the CoR is also engaged in international activities, with the aim of fostering collaboration between local governments around the world that share Europe’s principles and values. There are plans under discussions for an official linkage between the European Committee of the Regions and the Trilateral Local Government Exchange Conference – a move that would give a local content to EU-ROK collaboration on the Korean Peninsula peace process and support President Lee’s plans to relaunch the inter-Korean dialogue and regional cooperation.
Conclusion
In the last years, the EU has been a supportive partner for South Korea and the US-led system of alliances in the region, also due to security synchronization between Europe and the Korean Peninsula following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war. However, when the geopolitical conditions were in place, Europe’s engagement on the Korean Peninsula would also take the form of actively supporting, and complementing, the South Korean government’s engagement policy toward North Korea and provide backing for the process of ROK-China-Japan trilateral cooperation, defending such an approach even when aspects of it cut against the grain of US strategic interests in the region.
It remains to be seen whether there will be a new push in Europe-South Korea relations that, alongside the promotion of security, defence and military ties occurring both bilaterally and in NATO framework , will also include elements of past cooperation in support of ROK President Lee’s engagement policy with the North and the neighbours, thus making the EU an asset again for those ROK policy makers – both at the state and the local level – who seek to promote the reasons of reconciliation and trust-building in Northeast Asia.
Nicola Casarini
Senior Research Fellow
Asia Institute-Bologna University