Central Asia is undergoing a period of significant geopolitical and economic transformation. The growing role of China, the changing position of Russia, the evolving regional environment following the Tajikistan–Kyrgyzstan border agreement, and the increasing importance of Afghanistan are reshaping the region’s strategic landscape. At the same time, new connectivity initiatives linking Central Asia with the South Caucasus and beyond are creating new opportunities and challenges for the region. We discussed these developments, as well as Tajikistan’s foreign policy and its evolving regional position, with Mr. Muhammad Shamsuddinov.
Tajikistan has traditionally maintained close relations with Russia, while China has become increasingly important economically and strategically. How would you describe the current balance between Russia and China in Tajikistan’s foreign policy?
I would not characterize Tajikistan’s relations with Russia and China as a classic choice between two centers of power. Dushanbe seeks to pursue a multi-vector foreign policy, within which Russia and China represent the most important directions of its foreign policy.
Russia remains extremely important, primarily in the areas of security, military and political cooperation, migration, and humanitarian ties. Tajikistan is a member of the CSTO, Russia’s 201st Military Base is located in the country, and a significant number of Tajik citizens work in Russia. Therefore, in the short and medium term, it would be practically impossible to replace Russia’s presence in these areas.
China, by contrast, has gradually become Tajikistan’s main economic external partner. In 2025, China and Russia together accounted for approximately half of Tajikistan’s total foreign trade – around 49%. At the same time, China has already overtaken Russia in terms of trade volume. However, this does not mean that China is automatically displacing Russia. In recent years, Beijing and Dushanbe have also actively cooperated in the security sphere, particularly with regard to the security of the Tajik-Afghan border, which is a concern for both countries.
Many experts often view the presence of Russia and China as mutually exclusive factors in Central Asia. There is frequent discussion of a shift in the balance, with the assumption that one country could displace the other in the region. I do not think this is an entirely accurate way of looking at the situation, because neither of these powers will be able to completely displace the other in Central Asia or in individual countries of the region. China, for example, will not be able to significantly displace Russia in the security sphere or completely replace it in the economic sphere.
In other words, the very presence of these two countries in the region is already based on a certain balance. Therefore, I believe it is premature to speak of any fundamental shifts in the balance between Russia and China in the foreign policies of the Central Asian states, and particularly in Tajikistan’s foreign policy.
China’s role in Central Asia has expanded significantly in recent years. Is Tajikistan increasingly focusing on China-related projects, or does Beijing’s growing presence give Dushanbe new strategic and economic opportunities?
I would say that both aspects of this question are relevant. Tajikistan is indeed becoming increasingly involved in Chinese infrastructure and economic projects. However, it would be incorrect to view this solely as a result of Chinese pressure or as a one-sided orientation by Dushanbe toward Beijing.
For Tajikistan, China represents a source of capital, infrastructure development, technology, and access to a major market. This is particularly important for a landlocked country that needs to develop its transport infrastructure and diversify its external economic ties.
Moreover, following the deterioration of relations between Russia and the West and the transformation of the broader Eurasian geopolitical and geo-economic environment, China’s importance for Central Asia has objectively increased. At the same time, there is a certain risk: excessive dependence on a single economic partner could limit the space for an independent economic policy.
Therefore, I believe the optimal strategy for Dushanbe is not to choose between China and other powers, but rather to make use of Chinese opportunities while simultaneously diversifying its external economic relations.
The 2025 Tajikistan–Kyrgyzstan border agreement was a major breakthrough, and the implementation of the agreement is now progressing. How could the settlement of this long-standing dispute affect regional stability and cooperation in Central Asia?
This agreement is significant for much more than simply resolving a bilateral territorial dispute. For many years, the Tajik-Kyrgyz border was one of the most serious sources of instability in Central Asia. Armed clashes caused damage not only to the populations of border areas but also to the broader atmosphere of trust between the countries of the region.
The settlement of this issue creates a fundamentally new situation. It gives Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan an opportunity to move from managing conflict toward developing economic and transport cooperation. Moreover, a stable Tajik-Kyrgyz border could contribute to the development of regional transport routes and closer economic integration within Central Asia.
I consider this one of the most positive geopolitical developments in the region in recent years. However, the ultimate impact of the agreement will depend not only on its signing, but primarily on the full and consistent implementation of the commitments that have been reached.
Afghanistan is becoming increasingly integrated into regional diplomacy, while Russia and Central Asian states are developing closer ties with the Taliban authorities. What does this changing regional environment mean for Tajikistan’s security and foreign policy?
For Tajikistan, Afghanistan is a much more complicated issue than it is for most other Central Asian states. It involves not only a direct security dimension, but also historical, cultural, and ethnic-political ties. Dushanbe has adopted a more cautious position toward the current Afghan authorities than some other countries in the region. At the same time, Tajikistan cannot ignore developments in Afghanistan. Moreover, the gradual normalization of relations between Russia, the Central Asian states, and Kabul creates a certain diplomatic dilemma for Dushanbe. On the one hand, Tajikistan is interested in a stable Afghanistan because instability directly affects the security of its southern border. On the other hand, Dushanbe has concerns about the political system of the current Afghan authorities and the situation of Tajiks and other ethnic groups in Afghanistan.
Therefore, I believe that in the near future Tajikistan will pursue a policy of cautious pragmatism: maintaining contacts on security and economic issues while preserving its own position on the need for the establishment of an inclusive government in Afghanistan.
The United States and other external actors are also seeking a stronger presence in Central Asia. How do you see Tajikistan’s strategy of maintaining relations with Russia and China while engaging with the United States and other partners?
This is precisely the foundation of Tajikistan’s multi-vector foreign policy. Dushanbe has an objective interest in avoiding dependence on any single external center of power.
At the same time, I would not frame the issue in terms of “Russia or China versus the United States.” For Tajikistan, a much more rational approach is to engage with all major powers wherever this corresponds to the country’s national interests. Russia remains an extremely important partner in the areas of security, the economy, and migration; China is the largest economic partner; while the United States and European countries can provide additional opportunities in investment, education, technology, human capital development, and institutional cooperation.
The main problem is that competition among the major powers is becoming increasingly intense. Therefore, Dushanbe has to pursue a much more nuanced foreign policy in order to expand its international ties without becoming a participant in geopolitical confrontation.
New connectivity initiatives, including the Trans-Caspian Corridor and the TRIPP framework, could strengthen links between Central Asia and the South Caucasus. What opportunities could these developments create for Tajikistan, and how realistic is greater Tajik participation in these routes?
For Tajikistan, this is primarily a question of overcoming its geographical isolation and finding alternative routes to international markets. Tajikistan is in a disadvantaged position in terms of transport geography: it is landlocked, while a significant part of its foreign trade has historically been oriented northward through Russia and eastward through China. Therefore, the development of routes through Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Türkiye could potentially create an additional corridor for Tajik trade.
However, it is important to remain realistic. Geographically, Tajikistan is somewhat removed from the main route of the Middle Corridor. Therefore, its full integration into these routes would require the development of appropriate infrastructure and efficient transport links with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and other countries in the region.
I believe Tajikistan’s participation is entirely possible, but more likely through gradual integration into the emerging transport system rather than by immediately becoming one of the central hubs of the Trans-Caspian route. At the same time, this direction is strategically important for Dushanbe precisely because it can help diversify the country’s transport and trade connections.
Looking ahead, what do you consider the biggest strategic challenge for Tajikistan: managing great-power competition, instability in Afghanistan, economic dependence, or the changing regional security environment?
I would not single out just one factor. The main challenge lies precisely in the need to manage all of these processes simultaneously. Tajikistan is located at the intersection of the interests of several major powers. Russia remains a crucial partner in the areas of security and migration; China is strengthening its economic presence; the United States and European countries are seeking to expand their engagement; while Afghanistan continues to represent a potential source of threats and, at the same time, an important element of the regional economic architecture.
At the same time, Tajikistan faces domestic economic challenges, as well as the need to reduce its structural dependence on a limited number of external sources of income, markets, and investment. Therefore, in my view, Dushanbe’s strategic task for the coming years is diversification—in foreign policy, the economy, transport, and energy. The greater the number of alternative partners, routes, markets, and sources of investment available to Tajikistan, the greater its strategic autonomy will be.
And this, in my view, is the main logic upon which Tajikistan’s foreign policy should be based today and in the years ahead.
Muhammad Shamsuddin is a Tajik political analyst, researcher, and columnist specializing in Central Asian geopolitics, international relations, and regional security. He is a PhD candidate at the Institute of Philosophy, Political Science and Law named after A. Bahoviddinov of the National Academy of Sciences of Tajikistan. His research interests include Central Asia’s relations with Russia, China, Iran, Afghanistan, and other regional and global powers, as well as regional connectivity and the evolving international order. His analyses and commentaries have appeared in Tajik and international media.