South Korea has become one of the world’s leading arms exporters. During 2021–25, it accounted for around 3 per cent of global arms exports, marking a major change from the period when it depended heavily on the United States for military equipment. Export success does not simply mean selling more weapons. It also includes securing larger contracts, expanding into more countries, entering difficult markets such as Europe, and receiving repeat orders. This essay argues that South Korea’s success did not occur by chance or result from a single successful weapons system. Instead, it emerged from several factors working together: the threat from North Korea, regular spending by the South Korean military, close government support, the country’s strong manufacturing sector, and an export strategy based on competitive prices, rapid delivery, customisation, and technology sharing. The war in Ukraine accelerated this growth, but its main foundations were already in place before 2022.
South Korea’s defence industry initially developed because the country sought to reduce its reliance on foreign support. After the Korean War, South Korea depended heavily on the United States for protection and military equipment. At the time, most Korean companies mainly repaired or assembled American weapons. This began to change in the early 1970s amid concerns that the United States might reduce its military presence in South Korea. The government under Park Chung-hee therefore promoted greater defence self-reliance. The Agency for Defense Development was established in 1970 to support the domestic development of weapons. At the same time, the government invested heavily in steel, shipbuilding, machinery, and other industries that could support both civilian and military production. South Korea initially relied on licensed production and adaptations of foreign designs, but gradually developed its own technical skills and knowledge.
The connection between civilian and military industry remains one of South Korea’s main strengths. Major defence firms such as Hanwha Aerospace, Hyundai Rotem, Korea Aerospace Industries, LIG Nex1, and Hanwha Ocean are linked to larger industrial groups with experience in automobiles, ships, steel, electronics, and engineering. Hyundai Rotem, for example, can draw on production methods similar to those used in the automotive industry, while Hanwha Ocean benefits from South Korea’s strong shipbuilding sector. This meant that defence companies did not have to build large factories and supply chains from scratch. Instead, they could use skills and infrastructure that already existed in the wider economy. South Korea’s arms export success is therefore not only a military story. It is also connected to the country’s broader industrial development and its ability to produce complex products on a large scale.
Security as an Industrial Driver
The persistent threat from North Korea has also been a major driver of the industry’s growth. The key point is not simply the existence of tension between the two countries, but the steady demand for military equipment that this tension has created. Successive South Korean governments have continued to spend heavily on defence and modernise the armed forces across changes of government. Compulsory military service and a force of around half a million active personnel have also generated substantial demand for equipment, repairs, and replacement parts. This gave South Korean defence companies a reliable domestic customer. Early versions of tanks, artillery, and other systems could be tested and improved before being offered abroad. Regular orders from the South Korean military also helped spread research and development costs across larger production runs, enabling companies to offer more competitive prices to foreign buyers.
There is therefore a clear connection between security pressure and export success. The threat from North Korea encouraged steady defence spending, which kept factories operating and allowed firms to retain skilled workers, improve their equipment, and respond quickly when foreign customers placed orders. This gave South Korea an advantage over countries whose defence companies depend mainly on occasional export contracts. When orders are irregular, production lines may close, workers may leave, and costs may rise. South Korea’s large domestic market reduced these problems and made it easier for companies to offer both lower prices and faster delivery.
Another reason for South Korea’s success is the close relationship between the government and private companies. This is often described through the concept of the developmental state, in which the government plays an active role in directing investment and supporting industries considered strategically important. Two organisations are especially significant. The Agency for Defense Development supports research and the development of new military technologies, while the Defense Acquisition Program Administration, established in 2006, manages military procurement and helps Korean companies compete for contracts abroad. Its role is not limited to purchasing equipment for the South Korean military. It also supports negotiations with foreign governments, assists with financing, and provides political backing for major export agreements.
The government supports the industry in several ways. It purchases equipment for the armed forces, funds research, encourages cooperation among companies, and promotes Korean products overseas. Senior officials are often involved in negotiations with foreign buyers, particularly when a contract is very large. Financing, training, and maintenance packages can also be included to make an offer more attractive. However, this support may create financial risks for the government if buyers struggle to meet their payment obligations. Even so, the close relationship between the state and defence companies often allows South Korea to make decisions and organise deals more quickly than some competitors. Defence exports are therefore not merely commercial transactions. They also form part of South Korea’s broader industrial and foreign policy.
Government support alone would not be sufficient if the products were not competitive. South Korean equipment is attractive because it offers modern capabilities at a lower price than many American or European alternatives. The K9 Thunder howitzer and K2 Black Panther tank are two important examples. Another major advantage is production speed. South Korean factories already operate active production lines because they supply the country’s own armed forces. This means that output can be increased more quickly when a large foreign order is placed. Hyundai Rotem reportedly raised tank production from around three or four units per month to more than ten following the Polish order. By contrast, many European factories had reduced production after the Cold War and could not expand as quickly.
South Korean companies also compete by being willing to adapt their products and cooperate closely with buyers. Customers are often offered local assembly, technology sharing, training, maintenance, and modifications suited to their own military requirements. Poland’s planned K2PL tank programme is one example, as it is expected to include local production and cooperation with Korean companies. The FA-50 light fighter has also been sold to countries including Poland, Indonesia, Iraq, Malaysia, and the Philippines. It is attractive because it provides countries with a capable aircraft at a lower cost than many larger fighter aircraft. The Redback infantry fighting vehicle, selected by Australia, further demonstrates that Korean firms can design equipment for the specific needs of foreign customers. Overall, South Korea occupies a favourable position in the market. Its products are often more advanced and trusted than those of newer suppliers, while remaining cheaper, faster to deliver, and more flexible than many Western alternatives.
The Ukraine War and Korea’s Export Boom
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 created a major opportunity for South Korean exporters. European countries sought to replace equipment sent to Ukraine and rebuild their own military stocks. However, many American and European companies faced long waiting times and limited spare production capacity. Poland became the clearest example of this shift. Beginning in July 2022, it agreed to purchase up to 1,000 K2-based tanks, around 672 K9 howitzers, 48 FA-50 aircraft, and 288 Chunmoo rocket systems. By 2025, contracts associated with the tank and rocket components alone were worth tens of billions of dollars. The first tanks and howitzers arrived only months after the agreements were signed, which was faster than many established suppliers could manage at the time.
The Polish deals mattered for more than their size. They demonstrated that South Korean firms could manage large orders, deliver quickly, and offer long-term industrial cooperation. The agreements also increased confidence in Korean equipment across NATO countries. Finland, Estonia, Norway, and Romania have purchased Korean artillery systems, while other European countries have considered Korean tanks and armoured vehicles. However, the war in Ukraine did not create South Korea’s success on its own. Korean companies were able to take advantage of the situation because they already possessed operational products, active factories, experience, and government support. South Korea had also exported aircraft, ships, and missile defence systems to Asia and the Middle East before 2022. The war should therefore be understood as an accelerator of an existing trend.
Despite this progress, South Korea’s defence industry still faces several challenges. Some advanced weapons continue to depend on imported components, including aircraft engines and other technologies controlled by foreign governments. This can restrict the countries to which South Korea is permitted to export certain products. Export success also depends heavily on a small number of very large contracts, especially those with Poland. Delays, payment problems, or changes in government policy could therefore have a significant effect on Korean companies. Government-backed loans and guarantees make Korean offers more competitive, but they also place public funds at risk if buyers fail to pay. There may also be tension between foreign orders and the requirements of South Korea’s own armed forces if factories give excessive priority to export customers.
Competition is also likely to intensify. The United States, France, Germany, Israel, Turkey, and China are all major suppliers, while European countries are investing more heavily in their own defence industries. South Korea’s advantage in delivery speed may narrow as European factories expand. Technology sharing also creates a long-term risk. It helps Korean firms secure contracts, but it may also enable customer countries to develop their own industries and eventually become competitors. South Korea also remains behind in some of the most advanced fields, including stealth aircraft, military space technology, and autonomous systems. These challenges are unlikely to end its export growth in the near future, but continued success will require further investment, careful management of financial risk, and reliable long-term support for customers.
South Korea’s rise as an arms exporter is the result of long-term planning rather than a short-term accident. The threat from North Korea created regular demand from the South Korean military, allowing companies to test equipment, keep factories active, and reduce costs. The government supported research, procurement, financing, and overseas sales, while South Korea’s strengths in automobiles, shipbuilding, electronics, and manufacturing provided defence firms with a strong industrial base. Companies then used these advantages to offer competitive prices, rapid delivery, customisation, and technology sharing. The war in Ukraine and Poland’s large orders accelerated this growth, but they did not create it. South Korea is unlikely to replace the United States or the largest European suppliers in every area of military technology. However, it is likely to remain a major supplier of artillery, tanks, armoured vehicles, light fighter aircraft, and rocket systems, particularly in markets where buyers prioritise cost, delivery time, and local production.
Arda Akdoğan
Researcher