Introduction: Managing Risk in an Unstable Environment
The contemporary international environment is characterized by the simultaneous coexistence of strategic calculation and impulsive, risk-acceptant behavior, generating heightened uncertainty across the global system. South Korea has not been immune to these dynamics, experiencing both domestic and external turbulence amid shifting regional and global alignments.
As the Lee Jae-myung administration enters its second year in office, its foreign policy has continued to emphasize a framework of pragmatic diplomacy shaped by cautious yet proactive decision-making. Within this context, policy toward North Korea represents one of the most complex and consequential challenges facing Seoul, given that Pyongyang remains simultaneously South Korea’s closest geographical counterpart and its most persistent security risk.
From Confrontation to Pragmatism: Policy Context before the Lee Administration
The previous Yoon Suk Yeol administration’s North Korea policy was primarily articulated through the “Audacious Initiative,” which proposed North Korea’s denuclearization in exchange for large-scale economic assistance, development cooperation, and investment. Despite its seemingly generous framework, the initiative was never substantively implemented. In practice, the administration’s approach came to be defined by the principle of “peace through overwhelming power.” In the absence of sustained trust-building measures between the two Koreas, this posture coincided with increasingly hostile reactions from Pyongyang and a broader escalation of inter-Korean tensions.
North Korea’s confrontational trajectory predated the Yoon administration but intensified during this period. In September 2022, Pyongyang enacted the Nuclear Forces Law, declaring its status as a nuclear-armed state irreversible and authorizing the preemptive use of nuclear weapons under five specified conditions. Two provisions effectively lowered the nuclear threshold by allowing nuclear use regardless of whether an adversary’s attack was nuclear or conventional, and based on North Korea’s own assessment of an imminent threat. Consequently, the barriers to nuclear employment moved significantly below a traditional retaliatory second-strike framework.
Escalatory signaling continued in December 2023, when North Korea formally redefined inter-Korean relations as those of “two hostile states,” thereby rejecting prospects for reconciliation or unification. Subsequent months witnessed additional symbolic and material provocations, including the launch of thousands of trash-filled balloons toward South Korea and the physical destruction of roads and railways that had previously connected the peninsula.
These developments unfolded alongside broader geopolitical shifts. North Korea’s involvement in the Russia–Ukraine war created diplomatic opportunities to deepen alignment with both China and Russia, reinforcing Pyongyang’s strategic confidence. The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty concluded between North Korea and Russia in June 2024 was widely interpreted as signaling a return to quasi-alliance-level relations. Support from Beijing and Moscow also enabled North Korea to avoid additional United Nations Security Council sanctions, publicly demonstrating an emerging alignment among the three states.
The Lee Jae-myung Administration: A Pragmatic Response to a Fragmented Environment
North Korea today operates with greater diplomatic visibility than during earlier periods of isolation. The joint presence of Chinese and Russian delegations at North Korea’s 2023 Victory Day celebrations was followed, shortly after the inauguration of the Lee Jae-myung administration in 2025, by Kim Jong-un’s appearance alongside Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin at a Chinese military parade. These developments intensified concerns regarding deepening trilateral coordination among the three countries. Given that China and Russia remain strategically significant partners for South Korea, the evolving regional configuration increases the necessity of a cautious and calibrated North Korea policy. The policy orientation and strategic background of the Lee administration therefore warrant close examination.
1. The Democratic Party’s Traditional Approach to North Korea
Historically, the Democratic Party’s approach toward North Korea has been associated with engagement-oriented policies often characterized as a form of soft-landing. Earlier Democratic administrations pursued relatively cooperative frameworks with Pyongyang. President Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy represents the most prominent example, later continued in spirit by President Roh Moo-hyun. President Moon Jae-in, also from the Democratic Party, played a central mediating role in facilitating the 2018 U.S.–North Korea summit between Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump.
By contrast, periods of conservative governance have frequently coincided with heightened confrontation. During the most recent Yoon administration, North Korea launched 74 ballistic missiles during his first year, exceeding the total number fired during the final five years of Moon Jae-in’s presidency.
The election of Lee Jae-myung following an adversarial conservative administration generated expectations of a comparatively less confrontational approach toward North Korea. However, the contemporary strategic environment differs substantially from earlier Democratic presidencies. The division of the Korean Peninsula has become increasingly institutionalized, while North Korea under Kim Jong-un has largely dismissed South Korea as a meaningful negotiation partner and intensified hostile rhetoric. Public expectations within South Korea regarding peace or reunification have correspondingly diminished. Simultaneously, North Korea has expanded its diplomatic space through the Russia–Ukraine war and strengthened coordination with China and Russia, seeking to consolidate a northern trilateral alignment. Nevertheless, Lee’s political affiliation has contributed to expectations that his administration would avoid overtly antagonistic policies toward Pyongyang.
2. The Lee Jae-myung Administration’s North Korea Policy
President Lee Jae-myung’s foreign policy is fundamentally grounded in pragmatic diplomacy. In approaching North Korea, the administration prioritizes practical considerations over ideological, idealistic, or strictly principled postures. Under the complex conditions surrounding the Korean Peninsula, the government appears less focused on producing immediate achievements — such as rapid denuclearization or high-level summits — than on maintaining a condition in which tensions do not further escalate. The underlying assumption guiding this approach is that North Korea’s hostile behavior is rooted primarily in distrust and fear.
Accordingly, the administration seeks to maintain robust defense and deterrence capabilities — not by lowering its guard through unconditional trust toward North Korea — while simultaneously attempting to draw Pyongyang toward dialogue and peaceful coexistence from a position of strength. This strategic orientation is reflected in the three guiding principles of North Korea policy articulated in President Lee’s National Liberation Day address on August 15, 2025. The first principle emphasizes recognition and respect for the North Korean system. While this position does not fundamentally depart from statements made by previous South Korean administrations, the distinguishing feature lies in its emphasis on coexistence between independent political systems with minimal mutual interference and on managing tensions rather than pursuing immediate unification. Importantly, refraining from hostile acts does not imply tolerance of provocations but rather the avoidance of unnecessary escalation alongside credible deterrence.
Together, these principles underpin the administration’s “Peaceful Coexistence Policy,” which advances three interrelated objectives: institutionalizing peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas by acknowledging a de facto two-state reality while maintaining the long-term orientation toward unification envisioned in the 1991 Inter-Korean Basic Agreement; establishing foundations for shared growth through peace-oriented economic cooperation, including potential projects such as the reopening of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and inter-Korean infrastructure connectivity; and pursuing a Korean Peninsula free from war and nuclear threats through a gradual strategy that prioritizes trust-building and sustained tension reduction over immediate denuclearization outcomes.
By consolidating these rules and principles, the Lee administration has proposed a phased and long-term North Korea nuclear policy aimed at moving from a nuclear freeze to reduction and ultimately toward denuclearization. North Korea, however, has declared that it will not abandon its position as a nuclear state and is further institutionalizing mechanisms governing potential nuclear use. The international community has long attempted to curb North Korea’s nuclear ambitions by increasing the level of sanctions and exerting sustained pressure. Yet, in the end, North Korea survived even under conditions of complete isolation, including periods when China and Russia had effectively turned away.
At present, however, China and Russia are once again functioning as protectors or, at minimum, as potential avenues of strategic escape for Pyongyang, making it difficult to expect substantial additional effects from further sanctions. As a result, pursuing a “whole package” deal that links denuclearization itself with sanctions relief—an approach adopted in the past—has become increasingly unrealistic. The bargaining power of sanctions has already weakened, and sanctions relief no longer serves as an attractive incentive for North Korea.
In the end, maintaining peace through incremental steps and preventing further deterioration of the situation has become the most urgent priority. In this context, the current South Korean government’s approach can be understood as realistic under existing strategic conditions.
Conclusion: Toward Managed Coexistence
As global geopolitical conditions grow increasingly unstable, South Korea faces an expanding range of diplomatic priorities requiring sustained attention. Under such circumstances, continued tensions and provocations from North Korea risk complicating Seoul’s broader foreign policy calculations and may reduce opportunities to maintain close and coordinated relations with other partners. In this context, pursuing grand ideals or engaging in policies that risk further escalation may be less realistic than maintaining a posture centered on crisis management. From this perspective, the Lee administration’s North Korea policy can be evaluated as highly pragmatic insofar as it seeks to remove unnecessary sources of friction in inter-Korean relations while pursuing coexistence in which both sides may advance their respective development and prosperity.
Nevertheless, significant challenges remain for the Lee administration. Foremost among them is the need to elicit a reciprocal response from Pyongyang to Seoul’s initiatives. Kim Jong-un has characterized the Lee government’s actions as a “deceptive act” and declared that South Korea would be permanently excluded from the category of a “fellow nation,” once again signaling the continuation of the “two hostile states” framework.
In addition, inter-Korean communication channels have remained severed for more than three years, suggesting that North Korea will require a politically acceptable justification before meaningful dialogue can resume.
Under the current strategic conditions, it is unrealistic for South Korea to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue through direct bilateral engagement alone. Seoul must therefore pursue a diplomatic approach that simultaneously combines inducement and pressure while preserving opportunities for dialogue. The high-profile summits between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un in 2018 clearly demonstrated that North Korea seeks negotiations primarily with the U.S. rather than with South Korea as an equal counterpart.
Although President Trump’s unpredictability remains an important variable, the U.S. currently faces an accumulation of pressing domestic and international challenges. Consequently, the prospect of an immediate direct summit with North Korea is likely to impose political burdens on Washington, and the North Korean issue is unlikely to occupy a high position among U.S. strategic priorities in the near term. Nevertheless, South Korea continues to function as a critical ally and partner of the U.S., creating structural space for Seoul to reassert a peacemaking role within the evolving diplomatic landscape.
Given the increasing complexity of the regional environment, South Korea’s most effective contribution may lie not in acting as a primary negotiating party but in serving as a mediator that develops practical agendas and facilitates the conditions necessary for dialogue. By actively assuming this pragmatic intermediary role, Seoul can make a meaningful contribution to regional stability and peace.
At the same time, South Korea must reinforce and carefully recalibrate its relations with China and Russia, both of which are re-emerging as key patrons of North Korea. The restoration of Pyongyang’s ties with Beijing and Moscow has strengthened North Korea’s confidence in its nuclear capabilities and provocative behavior, enhanced its perceived capacity to engage the U.S. on more equal strategic footing, and provided opportunities to compensate for previously limited technological and material resources.
Breaking this reinforcing dynamic—and the vicious cycle it generates—ultimately requires widening the strategic distance between North Korea and its external supporters, particularly China and Russia. These two countries remain indispensable strategic partners for South Korea, while South Korea itself constitutes an essential market and supply-chain partner for both. Although the current geopolitical environment constrains overt instrumentalization of these mutual dependencies, Seoul must avoid strategic disengagement and instead continue to manage these relationships cautiously, maintaining channels of cooperation while gradually seeking opportunities for diplomatic leverage and adjustment.